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Abstract: 
Does self-awareness amplify or dampen the intensity of emotional experience? Early research argued that self-
awareness makes emotional states salient, resulting in greater emotional intensity. But these studies induced a 
standard for emotional intensity, confounding the salience of the emotional state with the self-regulation effects 
of self-awareness. Three experiments suggest high self-awareness can dampen the intensity of emotional 
experience in the absence of this confound. In Study 1, participants were led to feel sad in the presence or 
absence of a mirror; a standard for emotionality was or was not induced. High self-awareness amplified sadness 
when there was a standard for emotionality; it dampened sadness when there was no standard. Additional 
experiments using a self-novelty writing task (Study 2) and a mirror (Study 3) showed that self-awareness can 
also dampen positive affect. A fourth study found that trait private self-consciousness did not affect emotional 
intensity after controlling for the effects of neuroticism. The intersections of self-focused attention and 
emotional experience are discussed. 
 
Article: 
Other animals have, at best, rudimentary self-awareness (Hyatt & Hopkins, 1994; Marten & Psarakos, 1994), 
but humans can direct their attention toward the self and thus be aware of their existence. The human capacity 
for self- awareness creates fundamental personal, social, and cultural consequences (May, 1967; Shibutani, 
1961). Emotions have always played a prominent role in psychological models of self-awareness. The original 
theory of objective self- awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), for instance, assumed close ties between self-
awareness and emotional experience. It argued that discrepancies between actions and ―standards of 
correctness‖ led to negative emotions. Because the person cares more about discrepancies when self-focused, 
the emotional consequences of discrepancies are more intense. 
 
Recent statements (Duval & Silvia, 2001) take a more differentiated position, distinguishing between emotions 
arising from self-discrepancies and emotions arising from other reasons. Clearly, not all affect results from 
meeting or failing to meet an internalised standard of correctness. This distinction is useful because self-
awareness seems to have different effects depending on the origins of the emotional state. As suggested by the 
original self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975), research consistently finds that 
emotions resulting from self-discrepancies are amplified by high self-awareness. Positive affect resulting from 
consistent behaviour, and negative affect resulting from inconsistent behaviour, are both more intense when 
self-awareness increases (Ickes, Wicklund, &Ferris, 1973; for a review see Duval & Silvia, 2001). This basic 
process can become the starting point for certain emotional disorders (Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Greenberg, 
&Becker, 1991; Wells &Matthews, 1994).
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Yet it is not entirely clear how self-awareness influences discrepancy-irrelevant emotions. Several theoretical 
approaches assume that increased self- awareness will attenuate emotional intensity. Rollo May (1967), for 
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 In this paper, self-awareness refers to momentary levels of attention directed toward the self. Self-focused attention  is a 
general term encompassing both situational self-awareness and dispositional self-consciousness. 
example, argued that our capacity for self-awareness creates a ―human dilemma‖, a tension between the 
mundane and existential features of self-awareness. Viewing ourselves as objects is necessary for regulating our 
actions and achieving complex goals. But objective self-awareness also enables self-evaluation and existential 
concerns. Focusing on the self as an object, according to May, creates a detached, unemotional experience of 
self: 
 
If I set out to deal with myself as ―pure object‖, fully determined and manipulatable, Ibecome driven, dried up, affectless, and 
unrelated to my experiences (May, 1967, p. 9). 
 
Experiencing self as subject, in contrast, creates rich affective feelings and an experience of self-determination. 
Successful living, in May’s view, requires negotiating the dialectic of self-awareness. 
 
The psychology of ―flow‖ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) takes a similar view of self-awareness and affective 
experience. Flow experiences are characterised in part by reduced self-awareness—attention iswholly devoted 
to ongoing activity. Flow states usually involve feelings of competence, unawareness of time, blurring of 
boundaries between self and environment, and pleasant affective states. Yet, when self re-enters the picture, the 
flow state is disrupted and positive affect diminishes (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 
1982). 
 
Although these theories assume self-awareness dampens emotional experience, experimental research is 
considerably more ambiguous. Scheier and Carver (1977), in an important extension of early self-awareness 
research, suggested that self-awareness clarifies internal states such as attitudes, sensations, and emotions. As a 
result, emotions should be more salient, and subjectively experienced more intensely, when attention is focused 
on the self. Two experiments supported the ―salience hypothesis‖. In one study (Scheier & Carver, 1977, study 
1), male participants rated the attractiveness of slides of nude women—high self-awareness amplified ratings of 
slide attractiveness. In a second study (Scheier &Carver, 1977, study 3), participants read positive or negative 
mood-induction statements. Self-awareness amplified negative affect, but not positive affect.
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But other experiments support the ―dampening hypothesis‖ suggested by Rollo May (1967). Kleck et al. (1976) 
subjected participants to electric shocks and measured pain intensity. Self-awareness was (inadvertently) 
manipulated by observing participants from behind aone-way mirror (Carver & Scheier, 1978). Observation led 
to significantly less pain, as measured by facial expressions, self-reports, and physiological measures. Later 
research deliberately manipulated self-awareness (Lanzetta, Biernat, & Kleck, 1982). Although many com-
parisons were not significant, participants exposed to their mirror images generally showed less intense facial 
expressions and self-reported emotions. Another experiment found that self-aware persons exposed to 
pornography reported significantly less bodily arousal (Gibbons, 1978). 
 
One reason why self-awareness might attenuate emotional intensity is because attentional resources are 
allocated to the self at the expense of other activities. Instead of being immersed in ongoing activity and 
experience, the person begins thinking about other concerns, particularly how the self relates to internalised 
standards (Scheier &Carver, 1983a). Self-evaluative processes can be incongruent with and distract one from 
thinking about a discrepancy-irrelevant affective state (Erber, 1996). Evidence for this comes from studies on 
how high self-awareness acts as a ―cognitive load‖ (e.g., Panayiotou & Vrana, 1998). Vallacher (1978), for 
example, found that highly self-aware people formed less differentiated impressions of another, a common 
effect of attentional load (Macrae, Bodenhausen, &Milne, 1998). This mechanism thus has strong indirect 
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support—the distracting properties of self-awareness (Panayiotou & Vrana, 1998; Vallacher, 1978) and the 
affect-dampening properties of distraction (Erber, 1996; Erber & Tesser, 1992; Silvia &Brehm, 2001) have both 
been well-supported. 
 
Testing the salience and dampening hypotheses 
The literature shows two sets of findings—some studies support the salience view, and other studies support the 
dampening view. How might these conflicting experiments be reconciled? One difference between them is the 
presence of demand characteristics. Experimental demand is never welcome, but it is disastrous in self-
awareness research. Self-awareness’s ―bread-and-butter‖ effect is enhanced conformity with standards and 
norms (Duval & Lalwani, 1999; Silvia &Duval, 2001a). If an experimenter inadvertently creates a situational 
standard for what the participant ought to do, high and low self- awareness groups will always diverge. 
 
Evidence for the salience hypothesis apparently contains such demand properties. In the first study (Scheier 
&Carver, 1977, study 1), participants were told the experimenter was interested in emotional responses to 
provocative slides, and that they should attend to their bodily reactions to the slides. In the second study 
(Scheier &Carver, 1977, study 3), the experimenter directly stated that he was interested in how well people can 
self-induce emotions, later reminded the participants to continue generating the mood, and finally administered 
a questionnaire containing only mood items. This surely communicated a desired response to the participant. 
 
Brockner, Hjelle, and Plant (1985) were the first to suggest the demand explanation for Scheier and Carver’s 
(1977) experiments. To test the explanation, they varied the intensity of the mood by using a strong and a weak 
negative affect induction. But their experiment inexplicably preserved Scheier and Carver’s demand 
characteristics by using the same instructions and cover story, the Velten (1968) induction procedure, and a 
questionnaire containing only mood items. The findings were also inconclusive. Self-awareness did not 
influence negative affect in the strong induction condition; it led to a marginally significant decrease in the 
weak induction condition. When participants were divided according to high, medium, or low levels of trait 
self-esteem, self- awareness had no effects on persons with high and medium levels of self- esteem. But in the 
low trait self-esteem group, self-awareness amplified negative affect in the strong induction condition and 
attenuated negative affect in the weak induction condition. In short, this study’s demand characteristics and 
inconsistent findings prevent it from supporting either the salience or dampening hypothesis. 
 
The present studies attempted to explore the plausibility of this explanation in an attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting findings. If support for the salience hypothesis results from demand, then the literature becomes 
much more harmonious. Study 1 tested the hypothesis that demand characteristics interact with self-awareness 
to amplify and dampen emotional intensity. Studies 2 and 3 extended this experiment using different self-
awareness manipulations, procedures, measures, and emotions. Study 4 explored the relation between private 
self-consciousness (Priv SC), an individual-differences approach to self- awareness, and emotional intensity. 
State self-awareness and trait Priv SC are often used jointly to provide converging evidence for self-focus 
processes (Scheier &Carver, 1983b). Priv SC apparently amplifies emotional intensity (Scheier et al., 1981, 
study 2), yet the dampening hypothesis suggests that state self-awareness can attenuate emotional intensity. 
Because self-awareness and Priv SC often show equivalent effects, it is important to consider why they might 
diverge. 
 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 tested the possibility that self-awareness can interact with demand characteristics to amplify and 
dampen emotional intensity. Participants were led to experience sadness in the presence or absence of a mirror. 
To examine the alternative explanation, ―standard‖ and ―no standard‖ conditions were added. The standard 
conditions paralleled Scheier and Carver’s (1977) procedure— participants were instructed to try to self-induce 
an emotional state. Emotions were not mentioned in the no standard conditions. When a standard for emo-
tionality is given, high self-awareness should amplify emotional intensity. When no standard is given, however, 
high self-awareness should dampen emotional intensity given past theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; May, 1967) 
and findings (Gibbons, 1978; Kleck et al., 1976; Lanzetta et al., 1982). 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 48 female undergraduates from an Introductory Psychology class at the University of Kansas 
participated as part of a research participation option. They were assigned to condition in a 2 (mirrorlno mirror) 
x 2 (standard/no standard) factorial design, using randomised blocks of eight. Two male experimenters were 
involved in the data collection, one of whom was blind to the experiment’s theory and hypotheses. 
 
Procedure 
The participant was led to a private room and seated at a table containing a large mirror, a file folder, a manila 
envelope labelled ―Questionnaire‖, and a white letter-size envelope. In the mirror conditions, the mirror’s 
reflective side faced the participant so that she could not avoid seeing her image. In the no mirror conditions, 
participants faced the mirror’s nonreflective side. To minimise suspicion about the mirror, the experimenter 
casually apologised for the state of the room, stating that he was borrowing it from someone else and was asked 
not to move anything. 
 
After obtaining informed consent, the experimenter said that earlier in the year the researchers had asked 
several people to write an account of an important event that had recently happened to them, and that the 
researchers were presently interested in getting other peoples’ reactions to these personal accounts. The 
participant expected to read several of these accounts, and to give her reactions by completing a brief 
questionnaire after each one. Participants in fact read only one account. 
 
Standard/No standard manipulation. In the standard conditions, the experimenter further explained that the 
researchers were particularly interested in emotional responses to the accounts, and that the participant should 
―try to induce the emotion suggested by the account‖ (see Scheier &Carver, 1977, p. 631). No additional 
information or instructions were given in the no standard conditions. 
 
All participants were then instructed to read the account contained in the file folder, complete the questionnaire 
in the manila envelope, and seal the questionnaire in the white envelope to ensure their responses would be 
anonymous. The ―first account‖ was presumably written by a female first-year undergraduate; itdescribed her 
recent experience of being dumped by her boyfriend of six years. Past research (Brehm, Brummett, &Harvey, 
1999; Silvia &Brehm, 2001) found that this account reliably induces sadness in female undergraduates. The 
experimenter was not in the room while the participant read the account and completed the questionnaire. 
 
Dependent measures. The intensity of sadness was measured by the item ―How sad did the account make you 
feel?‖. Related emotion questions ―How depressing was this account?‖, and ―How sympathetic are you toward 
the author of the account?‖ were also included. These three items were embedded among several filler items, 
such as ―How typical is the account author’s experience?‖ and ―How cynical is the account author?‖. The five 
filler items disguised the study’s purpose and allowed a test of the possibility that self- awareness simply 
polarises responses to all questions. Responses to all items were given on a 1–9 scale. 
 
To check the self-awareness manipulation, participants completed the private self-consciousness (Priv SC) scale 
(Fenigstein, Scheier, &Buss, 1975) using a 1–7 response format. Although the Priv SC scale was designed to 
measure chronic ―trait self-awareness‖, it is reasonably sensitive to situational changes in state self-awareness. 
Earlier research (Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990, study 2) found that the Priv SC scale replicated two other 
measures of state selfawareness—thought-listings coded for self-references and a pronoun-selection task 
(Wegner & Giuliano, 1980, 1983)—although it was less sensitive. Increasing self-awareness by completing 
personality questionnaires (Osberg, 1985), or by describing unique self-aspects (Study 2) also significantly 
increases scores on the Priv SC scale. 
 
Instructions at the end of questionnaire asked the participant to contact the experimenter; the participant was 
then probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked. 
 
Results 
No effects for the experimenter variable were found on any measure.  
 
Manipulation checks 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on the sum of the ten Priv SC items revealed a sole main effect for 
self-awareness, F(1, 44) = 22.6,p < .001. People in the mirror conditions experienced significantly higher levels of 
self- awareness than people in the no mirror conditions, indicating the manipulation was successful. 
 
A manipulation check for the standard variable was included toward the end of data collection; only the final four 
persons in each condition completed the measure. Responses to the question ―To what extent did you try to 
experience the emotion suggested by the account?‖ yielded a sole main effect for standard condition, F(1, 12) = 
6.84,p < .023. As expected, people in the standard conditions endorsed this item more than people in the no 
standard conditions. Given the small sample of four per cell, this should be interpreted cautiously. 
 
Emotional intensity 
An ANOVA performed on the question ―How sad did the account make you feel?‖ revealed a significant main 
effect for the standard variable, F(1, 44) = 26.7,p < .001, qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 44) = 14.82,p 
< .001. The sadness data are displayed in Table 1. The depression item yielded a similar 
 
 
 
standard main effect, F(1, 44) = 5.48,p < .024, and interaction, F(1, 44) = 12.76, p < .001. No effects were 
found for sympathy or any of the five filler items. Planned t-tests were conducted to examine the interaction’s 
form. 
 
Standard conditions. As predicted, Scheier and Carver’s (1977) findings were replicated when a standard for 
emotionality was induced. Persons in the mirror condition reported experiencing significantly more sadness, 
t(22) = 2.81, p < .01, and perceiving the account as more depressing, t(22) = 3.67,p < .001, relative to the no 
mirror condition. 
 
No standard conditions. When no standard was induced, the mirror condition reported feeling significantly less 
sad than the no mirror condition, t(22) = 2.63,p < .015. The depression item was nonsignificant, t = 1.5. 
 
No mirror conditions. There were no differences between the standard and no standard groups in the no mirror 
conditions for the sadness and depression items (ts < 1). Although one might intuitively expect the standard 
condition to be higher, self-awareness research repeatedly finds that pre-existing (Carver, 1975; Gibbons, 1978) 
and experimentally induced (Dana, Lalwani, &Duval, 1997; Duval & Lalwani, 1999) standards have little or no 
effect when self-awareness is low. 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 supports the argument that experimental demand is responsible for conflicting findings. Self-awareness 
amplified sadness when the experimenter told participants that they ought to try to self-induce an emotion. This 
is congruent with self-awareness’s tendency to promote consistency between self and standards (Silvia & 
Gendolla, 2001). When participants did not have such a standard, however, self-awareness dampened the 
intensity of sadness. This suggests, along with past studies (Kleck et al., 1976; Lanzetta et al., 1982), that the 
dampening hypothesis may be most accurate. 
 
Some caveats must be raised, however, due to the nature of the sadness induction. Participants were asked to 
consider another person’s misfortune in order to avoid emotions arising from self-discrepancies. Studies 2 and 3 
address this by using emotion inductions that involve the self but are still discrepancy- irrelevant. And although 
the demand explanation seems plausible, it is nonetheless possible that simply mentioning emotions to the 
standard groups made emotions salient—this salience may have amplified emotion apart from demand 
characteristics. Yet this seems unlikely, given that making an emotion salient need not make it more intense 
(Silvia & Gendolla, 2001); this is considered in greater detail in the General Discussion. It seems more likely, 
given the large literature on self-awareness and self-regulation with standards (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval 
& Silvia, 2001), that it created a standard for people to meet. 
 
Another unresolved issue concerns the effects of self-awareness on different emotional states. Research has 
found effects of self-awareness on pain (Kleck et al., 1976), negative affect (Lanzetta et al., 1982), and sadness 
(Study 1), but not on positive affect. Studies inducing positive affect (Lanzetta et al., 1982; Scheier & Carver, 
1977, Study 3) have failed to find a significant link. Several recent reviews have remarked on this asymmetry 
(Gibbons, 1990; Pyszczynski et al., 1991). This is unusual because some perspectives (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990) assume that self-awareness has particularly potent effects of positive emotions. Study 2 thus attempted to 
extend Study 1 using happiness. 
 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 manipulated self-awareness by making participants feel psychologically novel and distinct. Perceiving 
oneself as novel induces self-focused attention because attention gravitates toward distinctive stimuli (Duval 
&Duval, 1983). Although self-novelty manipulations are less common than mirrors, they have been well-
validated (Duval, 1976; Mayer, Duval, Holtz, &Bowman, 1985; Mullen, 1983). Mayer et al. (1985), for 
example, manipulated self-awareness by calculating the distribution of planets on the participant’s birthday and 
then describing the planetary alignment as shared by either 1 % or 50% of the general population. A Stroop 
measure of self-awareness indicated the 1% group was significantly more self-focused than the 50% group. 
Perceived self-distinctiveness, even on a dimension as trivial as an astrological diagram, can induce self- 
awareness. 
 
Apart from providing convergent validity, this manipulation also induces self-awareness without confronting 
people with their physical image. It seems likely that at least some self-awareness effects are exacerbated when 
people see their corporeal presence (Silvia, 2001). This might be particularly true for emotions, which involve 
the face like few other phenomena (Izard, 1971). Because facial expressions both reflect and influence 
emotional intensity, it is worth using a manipulation that does not make the face salient. 
 
Method 
Validating the self-novelty manipulation 
The self-awareness manipulation directs attention to self by asking questions that make novel self-aspects 
salient. In the high self-awareness condition, participants write their first name on the page and then respond to 
the following questions: 
 
What is it about you that makes you different from your friends and relatives? 
What are some ways in which you differ from most other KU students? Please list 7 traits that you would use to describe yourself. 
 
The first two questions draw attention to novel self-aspects; the third further increases self-reflectiveness (cf. 
Berkowitz’s, 1987, self-awareness writing task). In the low self-awareness condition, participants write 
responses to: 
 
Please tell us a few things about your psychology class and one of your other classes. 
Please describe the last time you went out to eat. 
 
These questions should not appreciably increase self-reflectiveness or perceived self-novelty. 
 
A total of 23 undergraduates completed either the high or low self-awareness form, followed by the Priv SC 
scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Aone-way ANOVA revealed that people in the high self-awareness condition had 
higher scores on the Priv SC scale than people in the low self-awareness condition, F(1, 22) = 5.38,p < .03. A 
second sample of fifty undergraduates completed either the high or low self-awareness form, followed by 
Wegner and Giuliano’s (1983) ―Linguistic Implications Form‖. This quasi-projective measure of self- focus 
consists of twenty sentences such as ―Someone stopped (them, me, us) to get directions to the stadium‖. 
Participants are asked to select the pronoun that best fits the sentence, although each pronoun is correct. People 
high in self- awareness choose a greater proportion of first-person singular (I, me, my) pronouns compared to 
people low in self-awareness. Aone-way ANOVA on the percentage of self-focused responses revealed a 
significant difference, F(1, 48) = 6.43,p < .015. As expected, people in the high self-awareness condition chose 
a higher proportion of self-focused responses (M = 0.53, SD = 0.18) compared to the low self-awareness 
condition (M = 0.42, SD = 0.11). These two studies suggest that the writing task adequately manipulates self-
awareness. Additional validity comes from a three-condition experiment (Silvia, 2001), which found that a 
mirror condition and aself-novelty condition showed similar effects on terror management processes compared 
to a control condition. 
 
Participants and design 
A total of 36 undergraduate students enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the University of Kansas 
participated as part of a research participation option. Three people were excluded—two were non-native 
English speakers, and another did not understand the procedure—leaving a final sample of 10 men and 23 
women. Participants were assigned to either a high or low self- awareness condition in randomised blocks of 
six. The experimenter was blind to condition. 
 
Procedure 
All persons participated individually. The participant was greeted by the experimenter and led to a private 
cubicle. The experimenter explained that the study concerned how people describe personal and social events, 
specifically how oral and written descriptions differ. Because the study on oral descriptions had recently been 
completed, the participant’s study involved written descriptions. The experimenter gave the participant a brief 
questionnaire and explained its contents. The first page assessed ―descriptions of hypothetical imaginary 
events‖; the second page asked for ―descriptions of actual experiences and events‖. The remainder of the 
questionnaire was described as ―standard scales included in all of our studies‖. 
 
Happiness induction. The first page of the primary questionnaire contained an mental imagery task designed to 
induce happiness. Participants were asked to spend several minutes imagining a hypothetical situation that 
would make them very happy, and then describe the situation in writing. The induction was ―unstructured‖; no 
constraints were placed on the content of the hypothetical situations. Past research has used used this induction 
procedure successfully (D’Anello, 1997). Unlike Study 1’s induction, this involved aself-referent experience. A 
hypothetical experience was used to avoid creating an actual self- discrepancy. 
 
Self-awareness manipulation. The second page contained the self-awareness writing task described above. No 
participant expressed suspicion regarding the happiness induction or self-awareness manipulation. 
 
Dependent measures. After the self-awareness manipulation, participants noted the extent to which eight 
emotion adjectives described their current mood, using a 1–5 response scale. The items ―happy‖, ―cheerful‖, 
and ―good mood‖ were selected before data collection as the measures of positive affect. The mood measure 
was flanked by filler items concerning verbal and written fluency to disguise the study’s purpose. Participants 
were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked upon completion of the questionnaire. 
 
Results and discussion 
The three positive affect items (happy, cheerful, good mood) were combined to form a composite measure of 
positive affect (alpha = .90). A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the high and low 
self-awareness conditions, F(1, 31) = 5.06,p < .032. As predicted by the dampening hypothesis, people high in 
self-awareness reported experiencing less intense positive affect (M = 2.71, SD = 0.96) compared to people low 
in self-awareness (M = 3.41, SD = 0.84). 
 
Study 2 thus extends the first experiment using a different procedure, emotional state, and a manipulation that 
does not make the face salient. It is worth replicating this study, however, because of the unconventional self-
awareness manipulation. The validation studies suggest that the self-novelty task effectively induces self-
awareness, but the task probably manipulates additional variables as well. Writing about self–other differences 
may itself influence mood, or serve as an opportunity for self-affirmation. Describing oneself in trait terms may 
also promote ―static‖ as opposed to ―dynamic‖ thinking (Wicklund, 1986). Although it is unclear if these 
variables predict a dampening effect, a replication would increase our confidence in the self-novelty 
manipulation and provide converging support for the first two experiments. Study 3 thus used a more 
conventional manipulation—a mirror—as well as a different cover story, procedure, and set of affect measures. 
 
STUDY 3 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 18 undergraduate women enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the University of Kansas 
participated as part of a research participation option. Participants were assigned to either a high or low self-
awareness condition in randomised blocks of six. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated at a table containing a large mirror covered with a thick cloth. The experimenter 
explained that the study was about how different types of creative abilities were correlated. The participant 
would complete several different creativity tasks, and the researchers would then see if creativity was general 
across many activities, or limited to specific domains. The experimenter explained that the first creativity task 
tested ―linguistic and expressive creativity‖—participants would be asked to imagine a hypothetical event and 
describe it in writing. The second task would ask participants to draw a self-portrait using a mirror. The 
experimenter briefly lifted a corner of the cloth to show participants the mirror, and restated that it would be 
used for the second task. (Participants in fact only completed the first task.) 
 
Happiness induction. The ―first creativity task‖ was the happiness induction used in Study 2. Participants were 
asked to imagine a happy event and describe it in writing, which would ostensibly be coded for ―linguistic and 
expressive creativity‖. The experimenter left the room during the induction. 
 
Self-awareness manipulation. When the participant had completed the happiness induction, the experimenter 
said that it was time for the second creativity task. After rummaging through his files, he remarked that he 
needed to get additional copies of the test and that he would return shortly. In the high self-awareness condition, 
the experimenter removed the cloth covering the mirror before leaving the room. The mirror’s reflective side 
faced the participant so that she could not avoid seeing her face and upper body. In the low self-awareness 
condition, the experimenter left the mirror covered. The experimenter had been blind to condition up to this 
point. 
Dependent measures. The experimenter returned after two minutes and handed the participant a ―mid-study 
questionnaire‖. Participants ranked their current mood on a 21-point scale ranging from –10 to 0 to +10 in 
increments of one. The endpoints were labelled ―very negative‖ and ―very positive‖; the midpoint of zero was 
labelled ―neutral‖. This item was embedded among filler items concerning creativity. The final measure was the 
20-item PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS was justified by mentioning that peoples’ 
mood sometimes affected creative performance, and that the researchers wanted to see if that was affecting their 
study. Participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and thanked upon completion of the questionnaire. 
 
Results and discussion 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to see if self-awareness affected the intensity of happiness. Means are 
displayed in Table 2. A significant difference was found on the bipolar mood scale, F(1, 16) = 5.58,p < .031. As 
in Study 2, the high self-awareness condition reported experiencing less positive affect than the low self-
awareness condition. A similar effect was found on the PANAS positive affect subscale. High self-awareness 
dampened positive affect relative to low self-awareness, F(1, 16) = 4.52,p < .05. The two groups did not differ 
on 
 
 
the negative affect subscale, F < 1. This study thus replicates Study 2 using a different manipulation, procedure, 
and standard measures of affect. 
 
STUDY 4 
The first three experiments strongly suggest that self-awareness can dampen emotional intensity. Now, it is 
worth considering private self-consciousness’s (Priv SC) effects on emotional intensity. Priv SC is ―the 
tendency to be aware of covert and hidden aspects of the self. People who are high on this dimension are 
presumed to be particularly attentive to their thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and other private self-aspects‖ 
(Scheier &Carver, 1983b, p. 193). The self-consciousness perspective thus predicts that Priv SC leads to a 
greater awareness of emotions, which in turn leads to greater subjective intensity. As Buss (1980) argues, ―[Priv 
SC] polarizes the affective component of any private event— positive events become more positive and 
negative events become more negative‖ (p. 14). 
 
Support for this prediction comes from a study in which persons were asked to volunteer for a study on electric 
shock (Scheier et al., 1981, study 2). To induce fear, the researcher told some participants that the shocks were 
painful; others were told the shocks were mild. The decision to participate in the study was the primary 
measure. The fear manipulation did not affect participation rates among persons low in Priv SC. Among those 
high in Priv SC, however, the fear manipulation significantly reduced participation rates. Scheier et al. inter-
preted this as support for the salience hypothesis: ―it was in fact the heightened fearfulness of high private self-
consciousness subjects which made them more likely to withdraw from the study when threatened with strong 
shock‖ (p. 12). 
 
Ingram (1989), however, questions whether Priv SC uniquely affects emotional intensity. Using a procedure 
based on an earlier study by Scheier and Carver (1977, study 2), Ingram found that Priv SC amplified positive 
and negative affect. Participants were then selected based on their joint scores on the Priv SC scale and the Beck 
depression inventory (Beck, 1967), creating a 2 6 2 factorial design. When Priv SC and depression were thus 
separated, Priv SC was unrelated to emotional intensity—depression was driving the amplification effect. 
 
Confounding variables might thus explain the disjunction between self- awareness and self-consciousness. To 
explore the generality and extent of confounding, Study 4 examined neuroticism as a potential confound. High 
correlations between neuroticism and Priv SC scales have been found (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), and 
neuroticism’s many links to emotional phenomena are well-known (e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). 
Neuroticism thus seems to be a likely candidate. Study 4 induced happiness in all participants and measured the 
intensity of emotional responses; the relative contributions of Priv SC and neuroticism were then assessed. 
 
Method  
Participants 
A total of 26 undergraduate women enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the University of Kansas participated 
as part of a research participation option. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were led to a private room and told that the study concerned personality and mental visualisation. 
They expected to fill out some personality measures, visualise and describe a hypothetical event, and complete 
additional questionnaires. Participants first completed the Priv SC scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and a 
neuroticism scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964), which were flanked by filler scales as a precaution. They then 
completed the positive affect induction used in Studies 2 and 3. 
 
After the positive affect induction, participants completed a questionnaire containing an affect measure. As in 
Study 3, participants ranked their current mood on a 21-point scale ranging from –10 (very negative) to 0 
(neutral) to +10 (very positive). This item was embedded among filler items concerning personality, dreams, and 
daydreams. Participants were debriefed and thanked upon completion of the questionnaire. 
 
Results 
Scores on the Priv SC scale were significantly correlated with positive affect, r = .47,p < .022, which replicates 
past research. Neuroticism scores were also significantly correlated with positive affect, r = .51,p < .007. The 
correlation between Priv SC and neuroticism was quite high, r = .67,p < .001. To assess Priv SC’s unique effect 
on happiness, a partial correlation was conducted to remove neuroticism’s variance. The partial correlation was 
nonsignificant, pr(23) = .16,p < .44, indicating that Priv SC had no unique impact on emotional intensity. 
 
Discussion 
Private self-consciousness (Priv SC) typically replicates the effects of situational self-awareness. This has 
historically provided convergent validity and assuaged the occasionally disgruntled alliance between social and 
personality psychology. Study 4, however, found that Priv SC was unrelated to emotional intensity—the scale’s 
correlation with neuroticism was driving the effect. This replicates and extends past research that found a similar 
problem with depression (Ingram, 1989). The possible psychometric and conceptual implications of these 
findings will be presented in the General Discussion. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
What is the relationship between self-awareness and the intensity of emotional experience? Some studies have 
supported the ―salience hypothesis‖, which argues that self-awareness makes emotions more salient and thus 
more intense (Scheier &Carver, 1977). Other studies have supported the ―dampening hypothesis‖, which argues 
that self-awareness diminishes emotional experience (Kleck et al., 1976; Lanzetta et al., 1982). The present 
studies cast doubt on the salience hypothesis. Self-awareness only increased emotional intensity when there was a 
clear standard for feeling sad (Study 1). This suggests that evidence for the salience hypothesis was due to 
experimental demand. All three experiments—using different manipulations, emotions, and measures—found that 
high self-awareness led to a decrease in emotional intensity, thus lending further support to the dampening 
hypothesis. 
 
The salience hypothesis’s empirical problems seem less surprising when its unusual conceptual underpinnings are 
considered. The original salience view explicitly argued that self-awareness does not actually influence an 
emotion’s intensityít only influences the emotion’s salience, or ―subjective intensity‖ (Scheier &Carver, 1977). In 
short, self-focused persons are more likely to notice their affective experiences, not to experience emotions more 
strongly. It is uncommon to find such sharp distinctions between intensity and salience. Indeed, some emotion 
models assume that the ―subjective‖ intensity is ―actual‖ intensity. Brehm (1999) argues, for example, that 
subjective intensity determines the corresponding intensity of action: ―emotions function as emotions (urge 
adaptive responses) only to the extent that they are felt consciously‖ (p. 20). Tomkins (1991) also assumes that 
the intensity of affect in consciousness reflects the amplification of physiological signals in the ―central 
assembly‖. And these dimensions simply are not independent. If intensity is zero then salience must also be zero; 
whether the converse is true depends on one’s view of unconscious affect. So although emotion salience and 
intensity might not be as redundant as these theories suggest, they probably are not as divorced as the salience 
hypothesis assumes. 
 
The second and more serious issue is the relation between salience and the direction of intensity, subjective or 
otherwise. Why should a heightened awareness of one’s emotion always lead to greater intensity? If self-
awareness is indeed clarifying an internal experience, it should promote veridical assessments of emotion 
regardless of the direction of intensity. Self-focused people might realise, for example, that their bad mood was 
not as bad as they thought—self-focus would thus lead to less intense self-reported affect. Assuming that the 
direction of intensity is confounded with salience seems unnecessary (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). 
 
Other intersections 
The present experiments sought to clarify conflicting studies and demonstrate that self-awareness can sometimes 
dampen emotional intensity. It is not fruitful, however, to assume that self-awareness will always have this effect. 
Indeed, positing an invariant main effect of self-awareness was one of the salience hypothesis’s liabilities. With a 
basic relationship established, future research should seek additional variables that moderate and circumscribe the 
relation between emotion and self-awareness. 
 
Self-awareness might, for instance, influence emotions on the input end of initial appraisals. High self-awareness 
typically leads to more internal attributions for both positive and negative events (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; 
Silvia & Duval, 2001b). Some evidence also suggests that dispositional self-focus leads people to overestimate 
the extent to which random events are deliberately directed at the self (Fenigstein, 1984). Seeing oneself as 
causally responsible for events, and perceiving events as being directed at oneself, are important components of 
emotional appraisals (Lazarus, 1991). Similarly, taking the perspective of another person typically leads to 
empathic emotion and altruistic motivation (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). Because self-awareness reduces 
egocentrism and enhances perspective taking (Hass, 1984; Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983), it might amplify the 
intensity of empathy through this indirect effect. In both of these instances, self-awareness increases an emotion’s 
intensity or likelihood of occurrence by influencing appraisal and moderator variables. 
 
There may also be individual differences and social norms that interact with self-awareness to influence 
emotional experience. People differ in their attitudes about the appropriateness of emotional expressions 
(Tomkins, 1963, 1965). Because self-awareness increases consistency between attitudes and actions (Gibbons, 
1978), it can probably exaggerate the effect of pre-existing standards related to emotion regulation or suppression 
(Silvia, in press). Likewise, social norms for emotional experience—like being happy on encountering a friend, 
being sad when delivering bad news, or being neutral when interacting with a stranger (Erber, 1996)—probably 
affect emotion regulation more strongly when self-awareness is high. This is one way in which self-awareness 
might increase emotional intensity. And perhaps emotional dispositions, such as affect intensity (Larsen &Diener, 
1987), will also have stronger effects when self-awareness is high. Self-awareness might thus influence emotion 
by making emotion-relevant attitudes and habits more closely aligned with behaviour. These possibilities are 
speculative, of course, and invite future research. 
 
A recent meta-analysis (Fejfar &Hoyle, 2000) highlights the importance of circumscribing the relationship 
between self-awareness and emotion. This metaanalysis’s conclusions contradict the current studies—it argues 
that self- awareness increases negative affect. Yet ―negative affect‖ in this analysis includes transient negative 
moods and emotions, emotions resulting from discrepancies, trait self-esteem, and emotional disorders such as 
panic disorder, phobias, various forms of depression, text anxiety, and generalised anxiety disorder. By ignoring 
moderators and conceptual distinctions—such as between discrepancy-relevant and -irrelevant affect, and 
between normal and disordered processes—very little information is gained. An incisive understanding will 
require looking at the boundaries of self-awareness’s effects. 
 
Self-awareness and self-consciousness 
State self-awareness and trait self-consciousness usually replicate each other. Study 4, however, found that private 
self-consciousness failed to relate uniquely to emotional intensity. The meaning of this finding is complex. The 
traditional view of trait self-consciousness distinguishes between a focus on ―private‖ versus ―public‖ aspects of 
the self (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1983b). The public self-consciousness scale has 
been long abandoned because research consistently cast doubt on its validity (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Gibbons, 
1990; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). The private self-consciousness (Priv SC) scale has recently encountered 
intense psychometric scrutiny (e.g., Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996; Chang, 1998; Watson, Morris, Ramsey, 
Hickman, &Waddell, 1996). The scale has several factors, which correlate inconsistently with each other and with 
other scales, and often fails to replicate certain self-awareness effects (e.g., Franzoi &Sweeney, 1986; Ingram, 
1989). 
 
These deficiencies have prompted researchers to argue that new conceptual models and resulting scales are 
needed (Creed & Funder, 1998, 1999; Silvia, 1999; Trapnell &Campbell, 1999). Some have already proposed 
alternative scales and conceptualizations (Trapnell &Campbell, 1999); others are currently developing alternative 
views of dispositional self-awareness (e.g., Creed & Funder, 1999; McKenzie &Hoyle, 1999). Some of these new 
scales have decided to retain the public-private framework (McKenzie &Hoyle, 1999), and others have 
abandoned it in favour of alternative models. Trapnell and Campbell (1999), for example, distinguish between 
―reflection‖ and ―rumination‖; Creed and Funder (1999) are also developing a scale based on a similar distinction 
between healthy and dysfunctional forms of chronic self-focus. 
 
The meaning of Study 4’s finding thus depends on which model of dis- positional self-focus is considered. The 
failure to predict emotional intensity clearly conflicts with the traditional self-consciousness model (Buss, 1980; 
Fenigstein et al., 1975). Yet the high correlation with neuroticism may be compatible with alternative models. In 
Trapnell and Campbell’s approach, for example, ―ruminative self-focus‖ is expected to correlated with 
neuroticism and other indices of psychological dysfunction. In McCrae and Costa’s (1997) five-factor model, 
dispositional self-focus is a primary facet of neuroticism. Study 4 would offer convergent validity for this model’s 
taxonomy, not indicate a confound. More research is needed to relate these new approaches to each other and to 
conceptually predicted effects. Because many of these models are quite new, and in some cases still unpublished 
or in development, this task awaits future research. 
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